Development of Non-Conventional Warheads by Iraq
by Daniel Leshem
The low accuracy of the surface-to-surface missiles in Iraq's possession. and those which it is developing or converting/improving increases even more the importance and priority - already high - attached by Iraq to the development of non-conventional warheads (chemical, biological and nuclear). It can ba reasonably assumed that Iraq has been investing greater efforts in developing chemical warheads for the various types of surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-surface rockets from the moment the plans for converting, developing and manufacturing surface-to-surface missiles and rockets gathered momentum. These efforts by the Iraqi military industry probably began with the development of chemical warheads for long-range artillery rockets (40-100 km.) such as the "Frog" and the "Lit" as well as for the Astros II/Seagill and "Ababil" 50/100 rocket launchers. This forms a natural continuation of the development, manufacture and extensive use that they made of medium and short range rocket launchers with chemical warheads, such as the BM-21 rocket launchers (with 20 km. range). An unconfirmed report states that the Iraqis developed and manufactured a chemical warhead for the "Frog-7" rockets (and/or the "Lit"). This report also stated that the chemical warheads for the "Frog" which were loaded with mustard gas (chemical warfare blistering agent) were evidently used in the Iraq-Iran war - a claim unsubstantiated by other sources.79
The Iraqi military industry possesses the technological base for developing various types of warheads, including chemical warheads for surface-to-surface missiles. This is based on the rich experience gained in projects for converting the "Scud" missiles to intermediate range missiles ( the "El Hussein" and "El Abbas"), which involved. inter alia, considerable development work to reduce the explosive warhead of the missiles; in other projects for developing surface-to-surface missiles such as the "Condor 2", which involved developing various types of warheads, apparently including chemical warheads; as well as in projects for developing chemical and other warheads (cluster and certainly also incendiary) for artillery rockets. The Iraqi military industry thus possesses the technological capability to complete the development and to manufacture chemical warheads for surface-to-surface missiles of the "Scud" family (the "Scud" the "El Hussein" and the "El Abbas" ), and it is possible that these chemical warheads are already in the manufacturing and equipping stages 80 At the same time, the effectiveness of these warheads remains unclear in terms of the dispersal of the chemical warfare agent, and it is possible that the Iraqi military industry is seeking ways to improve their effectiveness.
Saddam Hussein, in his various utterances since April 1990, stated clearly that he has authorized the commanders of the missile bases (surface-to-surface missiles) and air force bases of the Iraqi armed forces to launch chemical weapons (whether by means of missiles or attack aircraft) at Israel in response to an Israeli nuclear or chemical attack against Iraq or "Arab countries from Mauritania to Syria".81 These expressions raise the possibility that Iraq possesses surface-to-surface missiles equipped with chemical warheads. With that, it could be expected that the Iraqi president would express himself in a similar manner even if the missile development has not been completed as yet, since it appears that for him it is most important to demonstrate might and deterrent ability against Israel, Iran, Syria and other countries. He stresses the fact that the missiles and chemical weapons in his possession constitute means of deterrence and maintaining the balance against the nuclear and chemical weapons which he claims are in Israel's possession. For this reason, it is important to Saddam Hussein to be able to declare that Iraq has developed binary chemical weapons - which according to him are in the possession of the great powers and Iraq alone - in spite of the fact that his claim is unreasonable in view of the great technical difficulties encountered in the development of binary chemical weapons as experienced in various development programs in the United States, particularly in developing the Big Eye aerial bomb which was not completed (the only binary chemical ordnance whose development was completed in the United States is a 155mm shell). Moreover, binary chemical weapons do not at all increase the lethality of chemical warfare agents dispersed by chemical ammunition, so that a weapon of this type does not augment the might of the Iraqi army. It is possible that the "binary" chemical weapon which the Iraqis have is nothing more than a "cocktail" of two types of chemical warfare agents, instead of a single chemical warfare agent that is used to load the chemical ammunition.
It should be stated that the reduced warhead of the "El Hussein" and "El Abbas" missiles will also reduce the effectiveness of the chemical warhead for these missiles. It appears that the chemical warhead for the "El Hussein" will be unable to contain chemical warfare agents in excess of 150 kg.81 Such a chemical load is much smaller than the chemical load carried in the original "Scud" warhead in the possession of the Soviet army (filled with about 500 kg. of chemical warfare agent of the VX type, which is more lethal than the nerve gas in Iraq's possession). Thus the Iraqi surface-to-surface missile units will have to launch greater quantities of "El Hussein" and "El Abbas" missiles to deliver more substantial quantities of chemical warfare agents on the targets, which undoubtedly are the large population centers of Israel, Iran, or other adjacent countries. It should be stated that the quantity of chemical warfare agents required to attain 507. casualties over an area of 1 sq.km., varies from one type of chemical warfare agent to another. For example, at the.stage when the chemical warfare agent is still in the air (after being dispersed by the missile), a quantity of 4 tons of mustard gas (blistering agent), ~ tons of Tabun nerve gas, or 0.5 tons of Serin nerve gas would be required (these figures are apparently correct for a population located in the open and not equipped with any chemical warfare protective equipment whatsoever, as the chemical warfare protective equipment substantially reduces the number of casualties and the severity of injurieS).83 When the chemical warfare agent is already covering the ground (surface contaminant) much larger quantities are required in order to attain an equivalent number of casualties. Thus, in order to obtain a considerable number of casualties in a large unprotected urban center by means of missiles equipped with a small warhead and very low degree of accuracy, the Iraqis would apparently need to launch dozens of missiles equipped with chemical warheads. For this reason, it could be expected that the Iraqi military industry would strive to develop a relatively large chemical warhead for the "Tammuz 1" missile, which would be capable of delivering a relatively large payload at a range shorter than their maximum range (2000 km.). Iraq doesn't even require half of this maximum range in order to hit the large civilian population centers of Israel, Iran, Syria or other countries in the region, however, it will undoubtedly need heavier warheads, both conventional and non-conventional (at the expense of range). In addition to the "Tammuz 1", it is possible that relatively heavy warheads are also being developed for the "Condor 2" missiles (warheads weighing 500-1000 kg.), and possibly also for the "Fahd". Moreover, it can be expected that Iraq will strive to produce the more lethal VX nerve gas, requiring smaller quantities (relative to the Serin and Tabun nerve gases) to attain the same effectiveness.
It appears that Iraq, already very active in research, development and manufacture of biological warfare agents, has been and is engaged in developing suitable delivery means for them, among these, warheads suitable for surface-to-surface missiles and rockets. A suitable warhead must assure that the biological warfare agents (microorganisms) remain alive under flight conditions (temperature and high acceleration) and under effective dispersal conditions. Iraq may view biological warfare agents as effective and appropriate payloads for the surface-to-surface missiles in its possession (with a reduced payload), since relatively smaller quantities of biological weapons are required to achieve effective results, on condition that the dispersal. is reasonably efficient. It should be mentioned that among the biological warfare agents which are being dealt with by the Iraqi Research and Development (and manufacturing) Center located at Salman Faq 84 southeast of Bagdad, is anthrax, a highly resistant and highly lethal bacteria. which may be suitable, inter alia, for delivery by surface-to-surface missiles.
Besides microorganisms, the Iraqis may use toxins (poisonous products of bacteria, fungi, plants and various animals) of various types - such as the botulism bacteria toxin a. the possible payload of non-conventional warheads. This especially in light of the fact that toxins similar in many characteristics to chemical warfare agents will apparently prove suitable for dispersal by means of the warheads .Warheads were or are being developed for chemical warfare agents.
The Iraqi effort to develop nuclear weapons is evidently directed both toward the development of a nuclear bomb (aerial bomb) as well as- a nuclear warhead (for surface-to-surface missiles). Reports that the Iraqi nuclear program is engaged in the accelerated development of a nuclear warhead surfaced during 1989-85 These reports linked this development effort to the project to develop the "Condor 2" surface-to-surface missile, although there exists also an evaluation which casts doubt on the suitability of this missile for this purpose.86 It can be assumed that one of the operational requirements of the Iraqi military industry in developing the long range "Tammuz l" surface-to-surface missile is its ability to deliver a warhead which will be suitable from the aspect of its carrying capacity and its dimensions (almost certainly a warhead of about 100~ kg.) for the nuclear warhead which is in developmental stages. Noteworthy among reports which indicate the possibility of an Iraqi effort to develop a nuclear warhead are reports from the U.S. and Britain dealing with the seizure of a shipment of capacitors which were illegally acquired in the U.S. through Britain, in April 1990. It transpires from these reports that the Iraqis asked (by means of a dummy Iraqi British company, Euromac) the U.S. manufacturer CSI to supply them with capacitors which meet special requirements, indicating the intention to use them for a triggering device in a nuclear warhead and not for laboratory use (for developing lasers) as claimed by the Iraqis.87
The immediate effort to develop a nuclear bomb and nuclear warhead is based evidently on the Iraqi intentions to use a quantity of 12.5 kg. of high grade enriched uranium which remained in their possession from the nuclear reactor transaction with France. It can be assumed that this quantity will suffice the Iraqis for building one nuclear bomb or warhead only. The development efforts are evidently concentrating on a nuclear weapon of the implosion type,83 permitting the use of a relatively small quantity of fissionable material and achieving relatively good utilization of the material during the explosion (naturally according to design quality and accuracy). It is possible that the effort to develop a nuclear bomb will succeed over a period of 3 to 5 years. It can be assumed that the development of a nuclear warhead will require a longer time scale (5-10 years).
The development of nuclear weapons based on the above mentioned quantity of enriched uranium will provide Iraq with the prestige, power and standing resulting from such and will of course substantially augment the Iraqi deterrent or threatening capability. However, in order to attain true nuclear capability, the Iraqis need to obtain the capability to manufacture weapon- grade fissionable material. To this end, the Iraqis are working intensively in another direction: the establishment of a uranium installation - an installation which will obviate the need to reconstruct the "Osiris" research reactor which was destroyed by Israel in June 1981, or the construction of a new research reactor of military significance. The Iraqi effort, being carried out at Sawitha, south of Bagdad in cooperation with the "Sa'ad-16" defense research center in Mosul, is presently concentrating on the manufacture or the attempt to manufacture extremely high speed gas centrifuges. The knowhow and the equipment for the manufacture of the centrifuges were supplied to Iraq by the West German H and H Metalform company, and an expert from the MAN Technology company, who were questioned in mid-l990 by West German authorities in this connection. Iraq apparently receives additional knowhow, parts and materials in this sphere from China, Pakistan and Brazil.89 Iraq also attempted to obtain materials, parts and essential technologies for this purpose from West European and U.S. sources. This involved, inter alia, special steels "maraging steel-350" and the technology for manufacturing composite materials.91 It can be estimated that Iraq will be able to commence serial manufacture of centrifuges, complete the erection of the enrichment installation and attain a high enrichment percentage (90%) within a time span of 5 to 10 years.
In order to finance its nuclear program, Iraq was apparently partly assisted by Saudi Arabia, which promised assistance in rebuilding the reactor, allegedly for peaceful purposes only. It is possible that the rebuilding of the "Osiris" reactor will be carried out to some extent, with the help of west European countries, among others (mentioned in this connection were companies such as K.W.U. of West Germany and possibly also St. Gobain of France).91 It can be estimated that Iraq will be able to find covert ways of obtaining the required foreign assistance for rebuilding the reactor, just as North Korea succeeded in erecting a militarily significant research reactor and a plutonium separation plant. This was evidently accomplished with the assistance of several East European countries such as Rumania and East Germany and unidentified West European and .Japanese companies and Experts, in addition to Chinese assistance.92
In this connection, various reports should be mentioned regarding nuclear cooperation between Iraq, Egypt and Pakistan.93 A nuclear cooperation agreement between these countries has been in force since 1985, and they have or had a joint program for the erection of a nuclear reactor (apparently a research reactor) at Wadi El Gedid in Egypt. It is possible that this cooperation included, inter alia, the rehabilitation of the "Osiris" reactor (or the erection of a new research reactor) and uranium enrichment. It should also be mentioned that the chairman of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority stated in a newspaper interview at the beginning of 1990, that recently a "development (or progress) in the area of nuclear fuel system (or circuit)" has taken place in Iraq and that one of the possibilities is that he was referring to the project to manufacture the centrifuges and the erection of the uranium enrichment installation in Iraq.94
Appendix: Surface-to-Surface Missiles and Long-Range Artillery Rockets in Arab Countries Missile/ Supply Status No. of Maximum rocket source launchers range Comments Tammuz-1 Local develop- In dev- 2000km ment with foreign elopment assistance The project will evidently be executed with the assistance of experts and companies from Western Europe and possibly also Brazil. - There is a possibility of Egyptian involvement in development, a series of trial firings in Mauritania is expected soon. Scud B U.S.S.R. In svc 24-36 280 km It is evidently possible to adapt the launchers for transport and launching of "El-Hussein" and "El-Abbas" missiles. El- Local conversion In svc Approx. 600-650km Hussein 50 (or more) fixed & mobile launchers (inc. El-Abbas) Egypt participated/participates in the "Scud" conversion project ("El-Hussein" and evidently also "El-Abbas") (together with North Korea) and evidently also the East German Research Institute, in addition to German efforts employed in Iraq. El-Abbas Local conversion Evidently See El- 850-900 h. insvc Hussein Possibly a chemical warhead has been developed and is being manufactured for "El-Hussein". Condor 2 Development with In development 800-1000km foreign asst. International ioint project by Iraq, Egypt, Argentina and West European companies. Iraq is trying to complete development by itself with the assistance of West European experts. Frog 7 U.S.S.R. In svc 24 Approx. 70km Rocket; possibly a chemical warhead has been developed and manufactured. Astros II Brazil + local In svc Several Up to 68km manufacture with tens foreign assistance Rocket launcher; local production under Brazilian license and assistance. Ababil 50 Local manufacture In svc Several 50km with foreign asst. tens(?) Local manufacture uith Yugaslav assistance. The rocket and rocket launcer were developed in Yugoslavia. The rocket includes a cluster bomb warhead. Ababil 100 Local manufacture In svc(?) Unknown 100km with foreign asst. Local manufacture with Yugaslav assistance. Unclear as yet whether the rocket and launcer have reached the production stage. The rocket is equipped with cluster bomb warhead. Lit 90 Local develoment In svc(?) "Frog 90km with foreign asst. launchers" - The rocket was developed as the improved version and replacement for the "Frog 7" rocket, including development of a cluster bomb warhead and possibly also a chemical warhead.
* The table lists surface to surface missiles and long-range artillery rockets (range exceeding 40 km.) which are in service in Arab armies or in advanced development stages (at least) or in production in Arab countries. This table makes no mention of the transaction or negotiations between Syria and Libya and China for the purchase of the M-9 surface-to-surface missiles with 600 km range, as there is no evidence whatsoever that this transaction is being implemented, if indeed it was concluded. The table also makes no mention of Libyan projects for developing surface-to-surface missiles with ranges between 500-1000 km., assisted by West German experts, the project for development of the "Fahd" missiles in Iraq and a possible project for development of a surface-to-surface (?) missile in Saudi Arabia, also assisted by German experts, due to the fact that these projects are still in their early stages. Also no mention is made of various contacts between Syria and Argentina regarding the establishment of plants for the development and manufacture of surface-to-surface missiles of the "Condor 2" type.
Note regarding the sources: This table is based on available information sources, some of which are quoted in the Memorandum on the Military Balance in the Middle East 1988-89, published by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Endnotes:
79. In the chapter on artillery rockets in Jane's Armour and Artillery 1989-1990, it is written that Iraq is manufacturing chemical warheads for the "Frog 7" rockets (possibly for both "Frog 7" and the Iraqi "Improved Frog", the "Lit"). In addition, the director of the CIA testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 1989, that regarding Iraq, Syria and Iran, certain cases are known where the warheads of surface-to-surface missiles have been loaded with chemical warfare agents. He used the term "battlefield surface-to-surface missiles", which may mean long-range artillery rockets (over 40 km.) and short-range surface-to-surface missiles). It is possible that he was referring, for example, to the test firings which were conducted with chemical warheads. It should be mentioned that during 1988 it was reported that Iran conducted test firings of a surface-to-surface missile with a chemical warhead containing nerve gas. In this case also, it could possibly have been a surface-to-surface missile or a long-range artillery rocket.
80. An assistant or consultant to a U.S. Senator or Congressman whose name was not mentioned, claimed that the Iraqi missiles stationed at H-2 are indeed equipped with chemical warheads (Mid East Markets, April 16, 1990). In a report dealing with surface-to-surface missiles stationed at the H-2 and H-3 bases, it was said, based on U.S. intelligence sources, that Iraq has "warheads capable of delivering chemical warfare agents" (Washington Times, May 18, 1990). Senator John McCaine wrote in the summer of 1989 that chemical warheads are being developed and in practice may already be in service with the Iraqi army. ("Proliferation in the 19908: Implications for U.S. Policy and Force Planning," Strategic Review, Summer 1989).
The commander of the Israeli Air Force stated in July 1989 that in his opinion, the Syrians and Iraqis will succeed in developing surface-to-surface missiles with chemical warheads, however, he was of the opinion that they would not dare to use these weapons against Israeli civilian targets. On the other hand, it is possible that such missiles may fall on Air Force bases which will have to absorb an attack of such nature (Yediot Aharonot, July 17, 1989).
Deputy Chief of General Staff Ehud Barak stated in April 1990 that "it is possible that Saddam Hussein has a surface-to-surface missile warhead that can be loaded with gas, and if he doesn't have it today, he will certainly acquire such capability in the future. His capability has not changed, but it is also known that our deterrent capability has not changed" (Hadashot, April 8, 1990).
Following the beginning of the gulf crisis, official sources, among them the Minister of Defense, Moshe Arens, stated that "our estimate is that the Iraqis do not have chemical warheads, however they have suitable aircraft" (Davar, August 13, 1990). On the other hand, in an interview given by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in the second half of August 1990, he very carefully answered a question asking whether Iraq does or does not have chemical warheads for missiles, and in fact avoided giving a clear answer.
A senior military source was quoted in the Jerusalem Post of September 10, 1990 as saying that contrary to previous estimates by the defense establishment, "It is possible that the Iraqis have chemical warheads for their missiles. They have the ability to manufacture them." In addition, American and Arab sources recently stated that as early as 1989, Iraq conducted a successful firing trial of a medium-range surface-to-surface missile with a chemical warhead in northwest Iraq. (International Herald Tribune, September 15-16, 1990).
81. BBC SWB, April 18, 1990, ME!0741 A/2, quoting Bagdad Radio, April 16, 1990.
82. The chemical warfare agent capacity of the chemical warheads in Soviet possession is at a rate of about 50% of the weight of the missile warhead (according to data published by the Soviets themselves). It is thus estimated that the warhead of "El Hussein" which weighs about 250 kg. or 300 kg. at most, could be loaded with 125-150 kg. of chemical warfare agents. In any case, it is clear that the weight of the chemical agent will be less than the weight of the warhead, which is estimated at about 190 kg. (the weight of the warhead is based on data from the Iranians who examined parts and fragments of the "El Hussein" missiles that fell in their territory, some of which did not explode).
83. W. Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East", Policy Focus, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 1988, p. 7.
84. W. Seth Carus, "The Genie Unleashed: Iraq's Chemical and Biological Weapons Program", Policy Papers, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p. 30.
85. Washington Post, March 30, 1989. Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly, August 28 - September 3, 1989.
86. MidEast Markets, December 11, 1989.
87. Time, April 9, 1990; Newsweek, April 9, 1990. Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Exports: The Challenge of Control. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 1990, p. 24.
88. Mideast Markets, December 11, 1989.
89. Ibid.
90. Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Exports, p. 23, Mideast Markets, February 5, 1990.
91. Mednews, April 2, 1990.
92. Sunday Times, June 17, 1990.
93. "Alathad", December 4, 1985, quoted by the Gulf News Agency. African Defence Journal, February 1986.
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