Iraq built its chemical program with assistance from Western
sources, both individuals and companies, that supplied Iraq with vital
chemical processing equipment, chemical precursors, and technical expertise.
In the absence of UN monitoring or import controls, Iraq could revive a
viable chemical weapon capability in a matter of months, despite war damage
to its production and storage facilities. The Iraqis still have a domestic
chemical industry, and converting some of these plants from producing chemicals
to producing chemical warfare precursors and even agents would be relatively
straightforward. Iraq retains the capability to deliver chemical agents
using a variety of munitions, including artillery shells and rockets, aerial
bombs, spray tanks, mortar rounds, and SCUD-type missile warheads.
Iraq's past use of chemical weapons demonstrates its willingness
to ignore international norms of conduct. Iraq first used chemical agents
in 1983, when Baghdad attacked Iranian military forces with mustard gas.
In 1984, Iraq employed tabun-filled aerial bombs against Iran, making Iraq
the first and only nation ever to have used a nerve agent on the battlefield.
Iraq's successful integration of chemical weapons into offensive operations
is widely accepted as one of the reasons for its victory over Iran in 1988.
Baghdad used chemical weapons for their tactical and strategic value, not
to mention their overwhelming psychological effect on Iranian forces. Iraq
also used lethal chemical agents against its own Kurdish civilian population
in 1988.
Biological Program
Iraq revealed to UN inspectors in August 1995 that it
had a far more extensive and aggressive biological warfare program prior
to the Gulf War than it had previously admitted. The Iraqis claim to have
produced 90,000 liters of botulinum toxin and 8,300 liters of anthrax,
as well as significant quantities of an agent that causes cancer. Further,
the Iraqis claim to have loaded botulinum toxin and anthrax on SCUD missiles
warheads and aerial bombs. Baghdad also admitted conducting research on
mycotoxins and infectious viruses. The Iraqis claimed in August 1995 that
they destroyed the agents after the Gulf War (January-February 1991), but
have yet to produce evidence to support their claim.
Since the end of Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi declarations
and UN inspections have exposed an extensive dual-use fermentation capability
and additional facilities probably linked to the weapons program. Because
of their dual-use nature, most equipment and procedures related to producing
biological agents are rationalized as legitimate agriculture, biomedical,
and biotechnical industrial activities.
Coalition air strikes destroyed or damaged many of Iraq's
facilities associated with biological warfare, including those at Al Kindi
and Salman Pak. However, before the Coalition operations began, the Iraqis
had relocated virtually all of their agent production equipment to Al Hakam
and other facilities. All known fermentation and bioproduction equipment
remains intact, and key experts are still available to serve Iraq's military
programs. Consequently, Iraq retains the infrastructure that previously
developed and produced biological warfare agents and weapons, and could
easily renew production of biological agents when intrusive UN inspections
are discontinued.
BALLISTIC MISSILES
Soviet SCUD missiles were the basic building block of
Iraq's missile development program. During the late 1980s, Baghdad began
to enlarge the propellant tanks and reduce the SCUD warhead weight to reach
targets beyond the missile's 300-kilometer maximum range. Iraq also focused
on a domestic manufacturing capability for these modified SCUDs, as well
as the Badr 2000, a solid-propellant missile based on the Argentine Condor,
with a 750-1,000-kilometer range. Baghdad also had plans for a 2,000-kilometer
range missile, called the Tammouz I. As a result, by the start of Operation
Desert Storm, Iraq had in place a support structure for the eventual manufacture
of liquid- and solid-propellant ballistic missiles.
The principal missile launched during Operation Desert
Storm was the 600-650 kilometer SCUD variant called the Al Husayn. A variant
of the Al Husayn was also produced, known as the Al Husayn Short. The Iraqis
claimed to have fired another SCUD variant, the Al Hijarah, which may have
had a concrete-filled warhead, at Israel during Operation Desert Storm.
Even though most of Iraq's missile production facilities
received heavy damage during the Gulf War, Baghdad maintains some of the
equipment needed to produce ballistic missiles, in part because of the
dual-use nature of much of the equipment required for producing SCUDs.
Today, Iraq's production efforts are focused on developing the Ababil-100,
with an estimated maximum range of 150 kilometers, and the Ababil-50, a
Yugoslav-designed 50-kilometer range battlefield artillery rocket. Many
of the Ababil-100 liquid-propellant missile production technologies are
compatible with SCUD production.
UNSCR 687 prohibits Iraqi possession of missiles with
a range greater than 150 kilometers. Nevertheless, the United States believes
Iraq has hidden a small number of mobile launchers and several dozen SCUD-type
missiles produced before Operation Desert Storm.
CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER MEANS OF DELIVERY
Iraq has Chinese land-based and air-launched antiship
cruise missiles. Although its stockpile is likely limited, Iraq used French
air-launched and Chinese land-based and air-launched missiles during the
Iran-Iraq war. Iraq enhanced its anti-ship capability by forward-deploying
aircraft and by using aerial refueling to strike oil tankers in the Strait
of Hormuz. Iraq still possesses a variety of other platforms capable of
delivering both chemical and biological weapons, including artillery and
tactical rockets, combat aircraft and helicopters.
Libya
Libya has a long history of subverting and destabilizing
Arab and African nations by supporting coups, funding and training opposition
forces and guerrilla groups, and plotting the assassinations of foreign
leaders. Qadhafi has invaded, occupied, and/or claimed territory in all
of Libya's neighbors except Egypt. He has at times supported foreign Islamic
extremists, and he has frequently criticized Arab governments that have
attempted to open dialogue with Israel.
Under Qadhafi's leadership, Libya remains a potential
threat to the international community and neighboring states. While pursuing
his political and military aspirations, he has squandered the country's
oil wealth on a program for NBC weapons, missiles, and an enormous inventory
of conventional military equipment. Since seizing power in 1969, Qadhafi
has unsuccessfully attempted to turn the Libyan state into a regional military
power.
Qadhafi has demonstrated both his desire to acquire ballistic
missiles and an NBC weapon capability as well as his willingness to use
the capabilities at his disposal. In 1987, when his military operation
against Chad was nearing defeat, Qadhafi ordered his forces to use chemical
agents against Chadian troops. In response to U.S. retaliatory strikes
for the terrorist bombing of a Berlin discotheque, Qadhafi fired SCUD missiles
at the Italian island of Lampedusa. Although the SCUD missiles did not
cause significant damage, the act constituted a symbolic gesture of defiance
directed at the United States and the international community. Finally,
and more importantly, Qadhafi has ordered kidnappings and both supported
and employed international terrorism against Western nations.
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
Qadhafi, who remains largely unchallenged as Libya's leader,
controls nearly all policy decisions for his country. His aim is to enhance
Libya's military strength and power projection capability, in part by possessing
NBC weapons and missiles. Qadhafi apparently believes these efforts promote
Libya's status as a regional military power, enhance national prestige,
and provide Libya limited strategic military capabilities.
RESOURCES
Libya probably dedicates several hundred million dollars
annually to acquire NBC weapons and missiles, made possible by its substantial
income from oil and natural gas exports. However, since it does not have
the ability to produce these weapons on its own, Libya will continue to
rely heavily on foreign technical assistance.
STRATEGY
Qadhafi's efforts to become a recognized military power
in the region have been generally unsuccessful. Despite accumulating a
large military inventory, Libya has failed to develop its conventional
military capabilities, as evidenced by its embarrassment at the hands of
Chadian forces in the 1980s.
Even though Qadhafi has been successful in holding on
to power in Libya, he has not become a regional leader. His numerous schemes
to form political unions with other Arab states have failed, and his support
of insurgent and opposition movements has done little to enhance Libya's
standing or further its policy agenda. Qadhafi's continued support for
terrorism has resulted in an extended confrontation with the United States
and, more recently, has prompted United Nations sanctions.
As a result of these setbacks, Qadhafi has placed greater
emphasis on a more dangerous strategy: developing NBC weapons and missiles.
Qadhafi views these weapons as critical in his drive to establish himself
as the leader of the Arab world. In addition, he hopes that ongoing efforts
to develop and ultimately produce NBC weapons, especially nuclear weapons,
will give his nation prestige among Islamic and other Third World nations,
recognition he has sought for three decades.
NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Qadhafi's long-standing desire to acquire a nuclear weapon
is well-known. Nonetheless, despite concerted efforts, Libya's program
to establish an independent nuclear research and fuel cycle capability
remains in its early stages. Despite Libya's public pronouncements of its
peaceful intent, the underlying motivation behind this program continues
to be acquiring nuclear weapons.
Libya deposited its instruments of ratification to the
NPT in 1975 and its declared facilities are under IAEA full scope safeguards.
Libya's rudimentary nuclear program includes a small research reactor,
provided by the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s, at the Tajura nuclear research
center near Tripoli. Waning commitments by Russia to provide assistance
to operate and maintain the center have diminished activities at the site.
To compensate, and to build up its indigenous resources, Libya continues
to send scientists abroad for training and actively recruits foreign nuclear
scientists and technicians. However, Libya's program lacks well-developed
plans, technical expertise, consistent financial support, and sufficient
support from foreign suppliers.
CHEMICAL PROGRAM
Libya is one of few nations in the last decade to have
employed chemical weapons, having dropped chemical agents from a transport
aircraft against Chadian troops in 1987. Iran supplied the agents in exchange
for naval mines.
In addition, Tripoli has looked to establish an indigenous
chemical warfare program, and in late 1988, with extensive foreign assistance,
completed construction of the Rabta chemical agent facility. During three
years of operation, at least 100 metric tons of blister and nerve agents
were produced at this facility. When the United States brought Libya's
chemical warfare program to the attention of the international media in
1988, Libya responded in 1990 by fabricating a fire to make the Rabta facility
appear to have been seriously damaged.
Although the Rabta facility appears inactive, Libya's
chemical weapons program continues to flourish. To replace the Rabta facility,
Libya has begun constructing a large, underground chemical warfare plant
near Tarhunah, a mountainous region about 60 kilometers southeast of Tripoli.
Putting the facility underground masks its activities and increases its
survivability in case of an attack. In the meantime, Libya will rely on
foreign sources for its precursor needs. Libya claims it will not sign
the CWC as long as other countries in the region possess NBC weapons. Libya
almost certainly will keep its chemical warfare program as long as Qadhafi
remains in power.
BIOLOGICAL PROGRAM
Libya continues its efforts to establish a biological
warfare capability. However, hampered by its inadequate biotechnical foundation,
the Libyan offensive biological warfare program remains in the early research
and development stage. Libya may look to small research and development
programs supported by universities to fill in the gaps in its technical
knowledge. These technical shortcomings, combined with limitations in Libya's
overall ability to put agents into deliverable munitions, will preclude
production of militarily effective biological warfare systems for the foreseeable
future.
BALLISTIC MISSILES
Libya's only operational ballistic missile system is the
SCUD-B, acquired from the former Soviet Union in the mid-1970s. The acquisition
of an extended-range missile, such as the North Korean NODONG, and the
development of an indigenous missile -- designed to reach 1,000 km -- would
give Libya the capability to reach regional adversaries.
International constraints make purchasing a longer range
missile, such as North Korea's NODONG, difficult. In addition, developing
an indigenous ballistic missile production program also requires extensive
foreign assistance. So far, Libya's program has made slow progress in its
13-year history, and has succeeded only in manufacturing liquid-fueled
rockets with an approximate range of 200 kilometers. However, despite this
lack of dramatic gain, the program continues to receive government support.
In addition to its liquid-fueled rocket program, Libya
also may pursue testing and production of solid-propellant tactical rockets
and missiles. Although UN sanctions have impeded its ability to obtain
the technologies it needs for these programs, Libya continues its research
and development efforts aimed at acquiring ballistic missiles.
CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER MEANS OF DELIVERY
Libya has Soviet-made shipborne and European-made land-based
and shipborne anti-ship cruise missiles. Libya has artillery and tactical
rockets, as well as several aircraft that could deliver chemical agents,
including MiG-23, Su-22, and Su-24 fighters; Tu-22 bombers; Mi-2 and Mi-8
helicopters; and AN-26 transports.
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