Soviet Chemical Warfare Agents Novichok and Substance 33:

Were They Used During the Persian Gulf War?

Howard T. Uhal, ex-Clemson University, Clemson, SC, USA

The latest Persian Gulf War ended in February 1991. A large number of the men and women who fought in that war came home with maladies very similar to the symptoms of chemical warfare (CW) agent exposure. It is also now known that in April 1991, the three top personnel in the Soviet chemical weapons complex were secretly presented the Order of Lenin by Premier Valentin Pavlov for having developed new chemical weapons (1). Is there a connection between the Soviet/Russian chemical weapons complex and those illnesses called "Gulf War Syndrome"?

In 1982 the Soviets began a top-secret CW development program code-named Foliant at the State Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology in Moscow (2). The program had the apparent goal of developing new binary weapons in response to the Reagan administration's CW initiatives. By 1987 Soviet scientists created a new binary nerve gas they called Novichok (pronounced no-wee-shok). Novichok (which means newcomer) has been described as "a new toxic agent ... an injury with it is practically incurable ... those who were once affected with this toxic agent have remained disabled for the rest of their lives (1)." The new nerve gas may even be 10 times stronger than VX gas, the most powerful weapon in the U.S. arsenal (3).

Existence of the Foliant program and Novichok was revealed in 1992 by chemists Lev Fedorov and Vil Mirzayanov in an article in the newspaper Moscow News (1). Both of them were arrested for their whistle-blowing efforts, and Mirzayanov ultimately lost his job and was twice imprisoned. Mirzayanov now lives in the United States, while Fedorov remains in Moscow.

A physical chemist by training, Dr. Mirzayanov is a leading expert in the field of chromatographic analysis of ultrasmall concentrations of substances. He began working in 1965 for the Moscow institute, whose name is abbreviated in Russian as GSNIIOCT, which ultimately developed the Novichok CW agents.

From 1986 to 1992, he headed the Department of Counteraction to Foreign and Technical Investigations for GSNIIOCT and its branches, with responsibilities for CW countermeasures. He is intimately familiar with CW agent detection techniques and with the Soviet chemical weapons complex.

I spoke with Mirzayanov in early 1996 about Novichok and the possible use of Soviet CW agents during the Persian Gulf War. I had agreed prior to the interview that we would not discuss any classified information. In spite of this limitation, he told me some very interesting things during a session that was more of a fascinating lecture than an interview.

Mirzayanov began by stating, "I'm sure that Russia, and USSR of course, didn't send Novichok to Iraq. I'm sure about that."

Since he knew that the focus of my inquiry had been Novichok, I started to suspect the interview would be a short one. But Dr. Mirzayanov continued, "But they [USSR] can send - could send - a chemical agent named Substance 33, an analog of VX gas." All Soviet/Russian CW agents have a "substance" code name: sarin is Substance 35, soman is Substance 55, etc.

Substance 33 is also known as Soviet V-gas. "It was produced in USSR instead of VX gas," Mirzayanov stated. "They always explained to American and other negotiators that they used VX gas," when in fact Soviet V-gas has its own unique structure and properties. This particular subtle Soviet deception may have had very tragic consequences.

Mirzayanov explained, "American troops in Iraq and [the] Gulf War were supplied by instruments for determination [of] chemical agents - known chemical agents, of course - VX, soman, sarin, maybe mustard gas. This is very good. But, Iraq was supplied by the Soviet Union not [with] VX gas, [but with] Substance 33," a CW agent Americans may not have been able to recognize.

As the former head of counteraction for GSNIIOCT, Mirzayanov expressed amazement at the apparent ineptitude of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, "They unfortunately didn't know that USSR [for] almost 15 years used not VX gas, [they used] Substance 33." Mirzayanov stressed that he did not know for certain whether Iraq actually had possessed Soviet V-gas, but stated that, "If Iraq used [Substance] 33, I'm sure that American chemical troops would have been unable to detect it."

Although VX and Substance 33 have the same formula and possess some common properties, as chemical analogs they have different structures and some unique properties. Mirzayanov maintained that all American CW agent detection equipment operated on the principle of what he called "ion mobility spectroscopy." He declared such equipment is designed and configured to detect a certain number of known CW agents. American equipment might be capable in principle of detecting Substance 33, but it would appear in a different output range than does VX gas. Operators might detect a signal from Substance 33 but not recognize it, perhaps thinking the signal was spurious or caused by some sort of contamination. As I listened to him, I realized Mirzayanov's description sounded eerily like the statements of many American and British veterans. Over and over, they were told "the alarms had gone off because of petrol fumes (4)," smoke, or some other contaminant.

Such "detections" were not confirmed because they didn't correspond to any known CW agents. Was the contaminant actually Soviet V-gas? "We should know exactly!" Mirzayanov maintained. Then he asked, "Could American troops at [that] time determine [Substance] 33 or not? If I were a lawyer of [the] American veterans, I'd ask [the] government for answers to this question. It's very important."

At least one source suggests the United States knew of the existence of Substance 33 before the Gulf War. A recently declassified defense intelligence assessment states, "Iraq is expected to begin producing the persistent nerve agent VX or an analog of VX this year (5) ." However, it is unclear when this assessment was made or whether the knowledge led to the timely implementation of measures to detect an analog of VX.

What is clear is that the formula and structure of Substance 33 became public knowledge when Lev Fedorov learned of them in 1993 and published the information in the Russian journal Chemistry and Life. Professor Fedorov is President of the Union for Chemical Safety (Russia) and has worked since 1965 in the Russian Academy of Sciences. An advocate of strict controls for all chemical weapons, Fedorov carries on a personal crusade, recently reminding everyone, "In reality, the structure of the Soviet-made V-gas differs from that of American VX-gas (6)." Figure 1, reproduced from his book about the Russian CW complex (7), shows the structures.

Figure 1: Comparison of the structures of Substance 33 (Soviet V-gas) and American VX gas. Substance 33 is on the left, and VX is shown on the right of the figure.

The Persian Gulf War has been over for six years now, and the U.S. has known the structure of Substance 33 for at least three to four years. This is more than adequate time to synthesize the gas at Aberdeen Proving Ground (or wherever) and test it to determine whether U.S. equipment is capable of detecting it. It is also more than enough time to redesign our equipment to improve its capabilities, if need be. So, there is no longer any excuse for not answering Mirzayanov's question:

at the time of the Persian Gulf War, could American equipment detect Substance 33 or not?

The Russians apparently already know the answer to this question. Why not tell the American people, too?

Mirzayanov also discussed other difficulties associated with CW agent detection. He said that if any Iraqi CW agents were burned by an incomplete combustion process (before or during the war), the fine solid particles created may have contained toxic combustion products and adsorbed CW agent itself. Such particles may have been transported by wind and deposited on or breathed by soldiers, but they would have been undetectable, since American equipment could only detect CW agents in vapor form. And if such particles contained adsorbed Substance 33, he was certain nobody could have detected that, even if the instruments were designed and calibrated to detect Substance 33 in vapor form. CW agent detection equipment just cannot detect agents in solid form (so-called "dusty" agents).

Substance 33 could also have been mixed with sand particles and transported by the wind to soldiers, while remaining undetected. "It's another very important question I'd ask any government officials or military people," namely, how do they know personnel were not exposed to CW agents if the equipment couldn't detect agents in solid form? "Unfortunately, they were not ready to determine these substances," he alleged.

I asked Dr. Mirzayanov what he knew about any possible transfer of Soviet CW materials to Iraq. He said that in the 1980s some CW agents were sent from USSR to the Middle East: to Syria and maybe to Iraq. Those who know the details concerning what was transferred and to whom refuse to testify because of the danger involved. "Nobody wants to go to jail," he said. We may never know the names of all of the parties who helped Saddam Hussein, but I took consolation in the knowledge that the United Nations is still looking into the matter (8).

I shared with Mirzayanov the list of reported symptoms of Gulf War Syndrome. Although he is not a medical doctor, Mirzayanov has an extensive knowledge of the effects of CW agent poisoning from reading Soviet CW manuals, from talking to actual victims of poisonings, and from working closely with doctors from the Department of Medical and Biological Investigations of GSNIIOCT.

He said that the following symptoms of Gulf War Syndrome are consistent with chemical weapons poisoning and its aftermath:

aching joints, chronic fatigue, memory loss, sleep difficulties, headaches, skin rashes, concentration loss, depression, muscle spasms, nervousness, blurred vision, anxiety, breathing problems, chest pains, dizziness, nausea, chemical sensitivity and eye pain. According to him, these symptoms are typical after CW poisoning because of the action on the central nervous system. And he emphasized that after serious CW poisoning, no one can really be fully rehabilitated. Some damage will be permanent.

I also asked him about mutagenic and teratogenic effects of CW agents. He said that many CW agents, such as mustard gas, can change genetic information. But he had no specific data on VX, Substance 33, or Novichok. "Nobody knows," he said.

The types of studies which are necessary to investigate such effects are very expensive and perhaps haven't yet been done, he suggested. He had no information about offspring of those who participated in human experimentation with CW agents or of those who were the victims of Novichok poisoning. "[The] third question to government [and] military people," he said, "should be 'What about that?'." What are all the effects of exposure to modern CW agents? Perhaps when we start seeing the studies of Gulf War veterans and their families showing up in the environmental impact statements of the nerve gas incinerators the Army intends to build in the United States, we will know how to answer Mirzayanov's third question.

But until then we can get an idea by looking at the health problems of the persons who produced Soviet V-gas or who were exposed to it during human experimentation in the former Soviet Union. Professor Fedorov provided me with a document written by workers at the plant which produced Substance 33 (V-gas).

It reads, in part, "All correspondence and decisions concerning V-gas production and the workers' health were and are classified, so we cannot submit any document to the court ... All of us ... feel now that, because of accumulative properties of V-gas, we were affected by neurotropic phosphorous organic chemicals.

"It turned out that, without our consent and desire, we were under a big experiment on such an influence. Doctors and scientists say now that, before the start of the production, they knew neither about remote consequences of V-gas effect on man, nor about the possibility of chronic effect on man of small quantities of V-gas. Nevertheless, nobody wants to acknowledge that such an experiment took place.

"Our health has been ruined. Many of us see that our work in V-gas production affected [the] health of our children as well.

Ecology of our town has been undermined ... Our health steadily deteriorates, [and] the nervous system (central and peripheral) collapses, so does the liver, the heart fails (9)." Many Gulf War veterans will probably see their own situations mirrored in these words from the Chuvash Republic. Does that prove that Gulf War Syndrome was caused by exposure to Substance 33? No, but it does suggest a possibility worthy of further study.

The other body of information concerning V-gas exposure comes from individuals who "volunteered" to become human guinea pigs for Soviet nerve gas experimentation. One of these was Major Vladimir Petrenko, a resident of Saratov and a former chemical warfare researcher. Many months ago, Mr. Petrenko, who was once a member of the town council of Volsk, sent me a package of material which described his unfortunate history.

In June 1982 Petrenko took part in what he thought would be testing of defensive measures against new chemical armaments. The testing was conducted at Shikhany Institute on Russia's largest chemical weapons test facility near the town of Volsk.

The regimen consisted of one week of around the clock tests. During this period Petrenko was required to breathe a dilute CW agent for a minute or less. This dose was preceded and followed by batteries of medical and physical tests to measure the agent's effects. He recalls that the exposure temporarily improved his shooting skills. He also says that at least 30 to 40 other persons went through similar testing.

He started to notice some serious side effects in about 2-3 months. First he started losing the pigment from his skin in spots. Gradually he began suffering from metabolic damage, then from digestive and lung problems. Within two years he was found unfit to perform his duties as a CBR researcher; however, he then was forced to participate in the Chernobyl cleanup. Today he has been diagnosed as having at least 12 different diseases and is an invalid. Like the many Gulf War veterans exposed both to CW agents and depleted uranium munitions, Petrenko was exposed to chemical toxins and radiation.

And even though all the evidence suggests that he was exposed to Soviet V-gas (10), just like his American counterparts he was denied a pension because he could not "prove" the exposure had taken place!

The shameful manner in which Petrenko was treated by the Russian version of the Veterans Administration may remind U.S. veterans of their own experiences. Instead of acknowledging a connection between his CW agent exposure and his terrible health problems, Russian authorities have diagnosed him as having 12 "unrelated" idiopathic diseases. The gradual loss of pigment in his skin, for example, was diagnosed as "a disease of white spots" with no known cause. It almost seems like the U.S. Veterans Administration and the Russians are reading from the same script.

And what of our original questions? Dr. Mirzayanov testifies that Iraq didn't have Novichok, but on the issue of Substance 33 we are left with still more questions. Did Iraq have it?

Did they use it? And if they did, could American CW detection equipment recognize it? In reality only the U.S. government knows which Soviet/Russian CW agents were present on the battlefields of Iraq and Kuwait. Every MOPP suit and gas mask filter they collected after the attacks was another sampling device for the laboratories at Porton Down, Aberdeen Proving Ground, and perhaps even Shikhany to analyze. The truth is out there; all that is really lacking is candor.

I myself will add just one more question to those contained herein:

When is the United States government going to start telling the truth about what happened during the Persian Gulf War?

References Cited

(1) Fedorov, Lev and Vil Mirzayanov, "A Poisoned Policy," Moscow News weekly No. 39, 1992.

(2) Englund, Will, "Russia Still Doing Secret Work on Chemical Arms," The Baltimore Sun, October 18, 1992.

(3) Englund, Will, "Ex-Soviet Scientist Says Gorbachev's Regime Created New Nerve Gas In '91," The Baltimore Sun, September 16, 1992.

(4) O'Kane, Maggie, "Riding the Storm: How to Tell Lies and Win Wars," The Guardian Weekend, December 16, 1995.

(5) Department of Defense GulfLINK file 02200639.89, Subject: Defense Intelligence Assessment - IRAQI Military Developments Through 1992 [date of origination unspecified].

(6) Fedorov, Lev A., "Psychology of Chemical Disarmament," a report for The Fifth International Symposium on Protection Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Stockholm, Sweden, 11-16 June 1995.

(7) Fedorov, Lev A., Undeclared Chemical War in Russia, Moscow, 1995 [in Russian].

(8) U.N. Document S/1995/1038, dated 17 December 1995, Tenth Report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission Established by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 9 (b)(i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991).

(9) Svetlakova M.S. (Chairman of Union-3 of Chimprom Workers at Novocheboksarsk, Chuvash Republic), an open letter entitled "To the International Community -- We Apply for Urgent Help," dated February 28, 1994.