DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE
INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction provokes
regional instability and challenges to the interests of the United States.
The United States is an international leader in developing and sustaining
global norms against the proliferation of these weapons and missiles. The
United States is actively engaged in dialogues with several states in regions
around the world to persuade them not to acquire these capabilities or
to eliminate capabilities they might have already developed. The United
States also is working with states to combat proliferation by assisting
them in gaining and assuring greater control over their dual-use equipment
and technology. States that gain weapons of mass destruction are able to
pose a significant military threat to the interests of the United States,
our allies, and friends. The Department of Defense actively contributes
to overall U.S. efforts to stem proliferation wherever it occurs and from
whatever source, including through active and passive defenses, and maintaining
the credibility of our security commitments against military threats, including
from adversaries armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and
the missiles to carry them. This section outlines the steps the Department
is taking to respond to the challenge of proliferation, and DoD measures
to respond to the military threats states pose with their NBC weapons,
in support of overall U.S. government efforts to respond to this challenge.
Informed by lessons learned (and some unpleasant surprises)
from the Gulf War against Iraq and by the systematic Bottom-Up Review that
identified post-Cold War military requirements, DoD has developed the Defense
Counterproliferation Initiative. As part of this initiative, the Secretary
of Defense has directed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the operational
Commanders in Chief (CINCs) responsible for the planning and conduct of
military operations, and the military departments and their uniformed services
give greater emphasis to counterproliferation requirements and considerations.
Specific objectives of the Defense Counterproliferation
Initiative are to: (1) prevent the acquisition of NBC weapons and their
delivery systems, (2) roll back proliferation where it has occurred, (3)
deter the use of NBC weapons and their delivery systems, and (4) adapt
U.S. military forces and planning to respond to regional contingencies
in which U.S., allied, and coalition forces face NBC threats. The ordering
of objectives is deliberate. In line with national policy, proliferation
prevention is the top priority.
To achieve these objectives, the Department of Defense
has requested $165.2 million in FY 1996 for counterproliferation. This
effort would fund specific high priority acquisition activities to provide
required military capabilities. DoD will also use these funds to modify
and adapt other programs (totalling $3.8 billion) that are strongly related
to the counterproliferation mission.
The Defense Department plays a role in support of all
facets of national counterproliferation policy. This overview begins with
proliferation protection, for which DoD has unique responsibilities, and
then reviews contributions to proliferation prevention.
PROTECTION
Overview
One of the core objectives in proliferation protection
policy is to convince potential and actual proliferants that NBC weapons
will be of no value because the United States and its coalition partners
will have the capability to deny or limit the political and military utility
of NBC weapons, and because the damage inflicted by U.S. and coalition
forces in response will far outweigh any potential benefits of use.
There is no simple solution or single response to the
threat posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons and their delivery systems.
As is essential with all new initiatives, the right balance has to be struck
between thorough, step-by-step planning and early action to remedy long
identified shortfalls. A comprehensive review of the military missions
and functions related to counterproliferation has been completed to ensure
that all aspects of the issue are assessed. DoD assessments have been coordinated
with congressionally mandated national reviews. Several acquisition programs
already in the pipeline have been augmented to remedy identified shortfalls.
Proliferation protection measures can be grouped into five areas of emphasis:
policy, military planning and operations, acquisition, intelligence, and
international cooperation initiatives. While much work is yet to be done
to acquire the required capabilities, there have been significant achievements
to date.
Policy
President Clinton's September 1993 policy statement to
the United Nations General Assembly established the groundwork for building
a new consensus within the United States and with our friends and allies
abroad concerning counterproliferation objectives.
Early in his Administration, President Clinton issued
guidance defining national nonproliferation policy objectives. Responding
to this guidance, the Secretary of Defense issued DoD implementation instructions.
Counterproliferation objectives and capabilities are now routinely addressed
in the Department's planning and programming processes, with prominent
emphasis in the Defense Planning Guidance. Military planning, training,
and exercises now give much more emphasis to proliferation when potential
major regional contingencies are addressed.
The underlying objective of the Defense Counterproliferation
Initiative is to make counterproliferation one of the matters that is routinely
given consideration within the Department's activities. Counterproliferation
is not of a unique nature requiring a stand-alone organizational structure.
Rather, counterproliferation considerations have ramifications for virtually
every aspect of the defense mission in this new security era and, therefore,
should be embedded in the day-to-day operations. Secretary Perry has directed
the establishment of a DoD Directive to fully reinforce implementation
of counterproliferation policy. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy has been assigned responsibility for the
development and implementation of DoD's counterproliferation policy.
Proliferation protection is based on the enhancement and
utilization of existing resources. Proliferation protection requires a
broad range of capabilities, including effective strategic and tactical
intelligence; battlefield surveillance; counterforce; active defense; passive
defense; and response to paramilitary, covert, and terrorist threats.
Military Planning and Operations
One of the objectives of the DoD Counterproliferation
Initiative is to integrate proliferation concerns into the existing DoD
defense planning process. At the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) conducted a review of
the missions of the CINCs and functions of the armed services in support
of the counterproliferation policy. To guide his study, the CJCS issued
terms of reference for counterproliferation activities to combatant commanders
that cover situations where the military might be called upon to support
U.S. policy. The study addressed how the Services organize, train, and
equip their forces to support the counterproliferation policy and the missions,
responsibilities, and force structure of each combatant command.
The final report of the Missions and Functions Study was
approved by the Secretary of Defense on May 5, 1995. It recommended that
counterproliferation be assigned to the U.S. armed forces as a military
mission. On May 24, 1995, the President subsequently revised the Unified
Command Plan to reflect this decision. The mission to counter the proliferation
of NBC weapons was assigned to those combatant commanders (CINCs) most
directly responsible for carrying out the defense of U.S. national interests
overseas where proliferation occurs and its immediate impact is felt --
namely, the CINCs with geographic areas of responsibility. The assignment
of counterproliferation as a definitive military mission will result in
optimized organizational arrangements between supported and supporting
CINCs, development of counterproliferation-specific operational concepts,
and tailored relationships between the CINCs and the U.S. Intelligence
Community and other government agencies that will improve U.S. forces'
ability to operate and prevail against an NBC-armed adversary.
The CINCs, Services, and Joint Staff are already engaged
in planning activities to support the overall U.S. government effort against
NBC threats. The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) was commissioned
by the CJCS to evaluate the overall U.S. military effort to respond to
the challenges of the new global security environment. The CJCS designated
counterproliferation as one of the nine central Joint Warfighting Capabilities
to be addressed in this ongoing series of assessments. Working from national
goals identified in the President's National Security Strategy, the JWCA
translates these national goals into military objectives and requirements,
and then identifies the military capabilities and programs necessary to
meet those requirements.
The key to effective planning for the operational challenges
posed by proliferation is a detailed analytical understanding of this new
security challenge and its implications for current U.S. strategy. Based
on this analysis, the Department is determining initiatives that optimize
solutions to the complex and myriad challenges posed by a future adversary's
use or threatened use of NBC weapons.
Joint Staff planners have been working with the CINCs
to refine counterproliferation priorities and required enhancements to
U.S. military capabilities for all warfighting missions. As a result, the
CINCs have developed a list of required capabilities to meet the NBC proliferation
threat. The CINCs place highest priority on those missions where the most
leverage could be exercised in a short time by fielding quickly enhanced
capabilities. This is in line with their responsibility to be prepared
to employ their forces for deterrence and defense, immediately.
The CINCs' number one priority for enhancing their counterproliferation
capabilities is improved equipment to detect and characterize chemical
weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW) threats, particularly at long
ranges. The wide variety of chemical and biological agents calls for a
variety of protective measures. Detection and characterization is one element
of passive defense. Thus, the ability to detect, range, and track CW and
BW clouds, particularly at long ranges, provides additional early warning
time for units at risk of attack.
The next CINC priority is the ability to intercept cruise
missiles. Emphasis continues to be placed on ballistic missile intercept,
but the widening availability of cruise missile technology (particularly
the development and potential proliferation of low-observable cruise missile
technology) requires military planners to prepare for this emerging challenge.
For counterproliferation, these intercept capabilities are termed active
defenses. These capabilities are particularly relevant for counterproliferation
because cruise missiles are an extremely effective delivery system for
BW and certain CW attacks.
Improved capabilities for the identification, characterization,
and defeat of underground targets are the next set of CINC priorities.
Proliferants are increasingly making use of underground facilities as they
respond to the demonstrated effectiveness in the Gulf War of U.S. precision
conventional munitions. For counterproliferation, the capabilities to address
these targets are termed counterforce. Further discussion of this issue
can be found in the Acquisition (Counterforce) portion of this section.
Similarly, CINC-designated requirements concerning improvements in intelligence
capabilities are addressed in the Intelligence and Acquisition (Counterforce/Battlefield
Surveillance) sections.
The regional commanders have identified additional requirements
for improved passive defense capabilities to operate successfully in NBC
environments. Biological vaccines are one example. One of the key ingredients
to dissuading proliferators from acquiring or using these weapons is eliminating
the value of NBC weapons and the delivery systems to the proliferant. Passive
defenses that allow sustained combat and logistical operations in the face
of attacks by NBC weapons and their delivery systems are among the best
ways to accomplish this.
Disabling above-ground NBC infrastructure, both production
capabilities as well as weapons in storage and on delivery systems, is
a CINC priority that poses some unique challenges. Collateral effects,
e.g., the dispersal of nuclear, CW, or BW material following an attack,
are of concern. Improved capabilities for prediction and minimization of
collateral effects are required. A related priority involves new munitions
for biological and chemical agent defeat. It may do little good to destroy
an incoming missile if the CW or BW agent is released anyway, perhaps over
U.S. or coalition forces.
Other items on the CINCs' priority list being pursued
and discussed later in this section include improvements in capabilities
for the detection and tracking of NBC shipments; prompt mobile target kill;
support for Special Operations Forces; and the ability to locate, detect,
and disarm NBC weapons in the United States and overseas.
Acquisition
The CINCs, working through the JCS, identify their requirements
for passive defense, active defense, counterforce, and capabilities against
covert/paramilitary threats. The DoD acquisition strategy accelerates programs
to meet these requirements, redressing shortfalls and funding research
and development (R&D) to provide capabilities that cannot be met with
current systems and technologies. The JWCA Counterproliferation Team is
a mechanism for providing linkage between regional commanders' requirements
and the Department's R&D investment programs.
To provide focus for the Defense acquisition strategy,
the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy has been designated
as the lead for counterproliferation programs within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD). The same official serves as the oversight authority
for chemical/biological defense programs.
At the direction of Congress, a Non-Proliferation Program
Review Committee (NPRC) was constituted in 1994. In its May 1994 report
to Congress, the primary volume of which has been made available to the
public, this committee identified key areas in which progress was needed
to improve government-wide capabilities for proliferation prevention and
protection. DoD established the Counterproliferation Support Program specifically
to address the DoD shortfalls in operational capabilities identified by
the NPRC. Congress provided the Counterproliferation Support Program with
$60 million in FY 1995 to jump-start the program, and $108.2 million has
been requested by the Administration in FY 1996 to accelerate the development
and deployment of essential military counterproliferation technologies
and capabilities. In addition, $57 million was added to the existing cruise
missile defense programs (in the FY 1996 President's Budget Submission),
bringing the total DoD enhancement for FY 1996 to $165.2 million. These
funds assist the Department in addressing specific counterproliferation
priorities in tandem with the existing DoD-wide FY 1996 investment of approximately
$3.8 billion in programs related to countering proliferation (of which
$2.4 billion is research, development, test and engineering (RDT&E)
funding to provide an active defense capability).
A follow-on Counterproliferation Program Review Committee
(CPRC) comprised of the Secretary of Defense (chairman), Secretary of Energy,
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff was constituted by Congress to provide status reports on activities
to accomplish improvements identified by the NPRC. The result is a coordinated
national investment strategy for counterproliferation. Details are contained
in the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Report on Activities
and Programs for Countering Proliferation, May 1995. Again, in the
interest of informing the public, most of this committee's product has
been released for general distribution.
The Department is focusing its investments in military
systems to support counterproliferation in four areas: passive defense;
active defense; counterforce; and measures to counter paramilitary, covert,
and terrorist NBC threats.
It should be noted that the programs outlined below represent
proposed, new, and ongoing DoD projects and new initiatives strongly related
to countering proliferation. General purpose and defense infrastructure
programs, such as the development and procurement programs for the various
military weapon delivery platforms, are not included because they contribute
to the basic capabilities of U.S. forces as well as capabilities for countering
proliferation. Most of the new investments leverage existing and other
in-development capabilities.
PASSIVE DEFENSE
In response to congressional direction, the Defense Department
has established an integrated Chemical-Biological Defense (CBD) program
under the oversight of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic
Energy. The same official has oversight responsibility for the Joint Program
Office for Biological Defense created to provide management oversight for
critical BW defense acquisition programs, including BW vaccine production
and BW agent battlefield detection programs. The Counterproliferation Support
Program leverages existing programs to accelerate the fielding of critical
systems and technologies.
Passive defense involves military capabilities that provide
protection against NBC weapon effects. Passive defense programs involve
contamination avoidance (reconnaissance, detection, and warning), force
protection (individual and collective protection and medical support),
and decontamination.
Within the contamination avoidance area, sensors for joint
task forces, mobile BW/CW reconnaissance, and systems capable of detecting
multiple BW/CW agents and characterizing new agents are being developed.
Technological advances are being pursued in remote detection, miniaturization,
lower detection limits, logistics supportability, and biological detection
capability.
In the force protection area, improved mask systems and
advanced protective clothing are being developed under a joint program
that will reduce the weight, heat stress, and logistics burden of current
gear. Medical research is providing improved prophylaxes, antidotes, treatments,
vaccines, and medical casualty management systems. Lightweight BW/CW protective
shelters and integrated collective protection technology advances are also
supported.
For decontamination, modular systems are being developed.
Technology development programs to examine advances in sorbents, coatings
catalysis, and physical removal are supported. The CBD program also includes
projects to protect U.S. forces from nuclear and radiological weapons effects,
including detection and warning sensors, individual and collective protection,
medical response, and decontamination. The total RDT&E and procurement
budget for the CBD program in FY 1996 is about $350 million.
As a counterpart to these activities, the Counterproliferation
Support Program leverages existing programs to accelerate the deployment
of important systems. Specifically, the program is supporting projects
to: (1) accelerate (by up to six years) the fielding of an advanced long-range
eye-safe infrared lidar (laser detection device) to provide long-range
battlefield warning of CW/BW use; (2) explore whether ultraviolet multifrequency
lasers can be employed to detect and characterize biological agents by
their fluorescent spectra; (3) develop miniaturized BW/CW point detectors
with increased sensitivity that are amenable to installation on unmanned
aerial vehicles; (4) accelerate (by two years) the procurement of improved
individual protective clothing and collective protective equipment; (5)
supplement the CBD decontamination technology base; and (6) enhance existing
joint NBC doctrine and training procedures by intensified battlefield simulation.
Approximately $30 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for these passive
defense elements of the Counterproliferation Support Program.
The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) and the military departments
also manage a number of passive defense programs. DNA has programs to ensure
the survivability of weapons systems in a nuclear environment; $95.5 million
has been budgeted for these investments in FY 1996. The Navy's Radiological
Controls program provides RDT&E of radiation monitoring equipment for
Navy and Marine Corps use. The Army's programs include the operation of
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, as the primary test range for biological and
chemical defense equipment and the Nuclear Effects Survivability program,
which develops technology to enhance the survivability of Army systems
in nuclear environments. Additional details may be found in the May 1995
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Report.
ACTIVE DEFENSE
This facet of counterproliferation involves programs that
improve capabilities to detect, track, identify, intercept and destroy,
and neutralize NBC warheads delivered by airborne launch platforms, ballistic
missiles, and cruise missiles, while minimizing collateral effects.
To address the security challenges posed by the proliferation
of NBC weapons and the ballistic missiles used to deliver them, DoD is
continuing to implement the new priorities established for ballistic missile
defense identified in the Department-wide Bottom-Up Review. These new priorities
respond to the end of the Cold War. They focus on requirements to prepare
for major regional contingencies that may involve adversaries with NBC
weapons.
The threat of the use of ballistic missiles has grown
enormously over the past two decades. Ballistic missiles have been used
in six regional conflicts since 1973. During the Gulf War, the United States
and its Coalition partners were unable to locate Iraq's mobile launchers
and halt ballistic missile attacks. Ballistic missiles -- coupled with
NBC weapons -- will pose an even greater threat to U.S. security and that
of allies and other friendly nations. To effectively counter such threats,
a layered defense is optimal, with effort being made to attack prior, at,
or immediately after launch so that NBC warhead debris and contamination
do not land on friendly territory or troops. While engagement prior to
launch is optimal, it may be more practical in some situations to engage
missiles after they are launched. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
(BMDO) has the lead in this technology and acquisition effort.
To achieve active defense against missiles armed with
NBC warheads in a theater conflict, DoD has developed a theater missile
defense (TMD) architecture that will entail deployment of multilayered
defenses. These layers consist of a lower tier including Patriot Advanced
Capability-3 (PAC-3), Navy area TMD, and Corps Surface-to-Air Missile/
Medium Extended Air Defense System (SAM/ MEADS), and an upper tier comprising
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Navy wide-area TMD; and
boost phase intercept.
The technologies necessary to destroy enemy ballistic
missiles during boost phase soon after launch are still being developed.
Additional efforts are aimed at gaining a better understanding of the dispersion
of BW/CW agents in flight and methods for neutralizing them to reduce collateral
effects associated with ballistic and cruise missile engagements.
BMDO is currently conducting several TMD programs including:
(1) boost phase intercept; (2) demonstration, validation, and engineering
manufacturing development for various TMD concepts including Patriot PAC-3,
THAAD, the Navy Upper Tier and Lower Tier Systems and Corps SAM/ MEADS;
(3) advanced sensor technology and innovative science and technology RDT&E
programs for post-2000 defense systems; (4) threat and countermeasures
projects that define adversary military systems to ensure a robust defense
system; and (5) assessment, modeling, and experimental activities involving
collateral effects release associated with attacking cruise and ballistic
missiles armed with NBC weapons. BMDO has budgeted approximately $2.4 billion
in FY 1996 to support these programs.
BMDO active defense programs are supplemented by a number
of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Navy, and Air Force
programs. In its air defense initiative, DARPA is developing the Mountain
Top radar for defense against manned aircraft, cruise missiles, and theater
ballistic missiles; $45.6 million has been budgeted for the program in
FY 1996. BMDO and the Navy will also provide FY 1996 funding for the Mountain
Top ACTD (Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration). DARPA's Enhanced
Program for Cruise Missile Defense will provide additional sensor platforms
and fire control capabilities to accelerate its overall air defense initiative;
$57 million has been budgeted for this program in FY 1996.
The Air Force is managing three programs in this area:
the Theater Missile Defense program, the Airborne Laser (ABL) program,
and the Space Sensor and Satellite Communication Technology program. The
Air Force will field one ABL prototype with a contingency capability in
2001. The ABL destroys theater ballistic missiles in the boost phase, causing
debris to fall on enemy territory, and it also provides a rapidly deployable
wide-area defense capability. Approximately $47 million has been budgeted
for these activities in FY 1996.
COUNTERFORCE
This component of counterproliferation involves development
of military capabilities to target (using battlefield surveillance and
other intelligence assets), plan attacks, seize, disable, destroy, disrupt,
interdict, neutralize, or deny the use of NBC weapons and launch platforms
and their supporting command, control, and communications (C3); logistics
structure; and reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition platforms
while minimizing collateral effects. Attack operations include action by
air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces.
In the counterforce area, DoD is working to improve capabilities
to defeat NBC threats before they can be used against U.S., allied, and
coalition forces and noncombatants. U.S. forces must be capable of a rapid
and effective response to contingencies throughout the world. Resources
are being applied to improving capabilities for battlefield surveillance,
target characterization, and munition/ agent defeat.
For battlefield surveillance, DoD is improving capabilities
to detect, identify, and characterize NBC forces and associated infrastructure
elements in a timely manner to support targeting, mission/ strike planning,
and post-strike battle damage assessments (BDA). Emphasis is being placed
on continuous wide-area surveillance; detection of mobile targets (particularly
NBC-armed mobile missile launchers) and improved BDA capabilities. DoD
is also enhancing capabilities for the integration and analysis of sensor
inputs. These capabilities are required to provide the data needed to support
attacks in the often very limited time windows available before mobile
targets move from previously identified locations. As the Gulf War demonstrated,
this is an extremely challenging problem. We were not successful in attempts
to detect and destroy mobile SCUD-class theater ballistic missiles prior
to launch. Such missions require the orchestration of inputs from sensors
in near real-time and the prompt response of weapon systems capable of
defeating these targets.
Target characterization -- accurate information concerning
the locations and characteristics of NBC related facilities -- is required
for counterforce operations. The detection and characterization of hardened
underground NBC facilities are particularly vital given the challenges
of defeating these targets. An underground location does not preclude a
facility from being located, characterized, and defeated. The warfighter
needs intelligence information that characterizes the NBC facility, ideally
to the level of resolution needed to direct precision munitions against
the most critical elements within it. This information needs to be supplemented
with modeling tools that can assist in target characterization and selecting
the most effective weapon.
To make effective use of this target information, our
forces must have weapons that are capable of penetrating through walls
and other barriers that provide protection for above- and below-ground
structures. They must also have munitions that can defeat the NBC targets
engaged. For biological and chemical weapon targets, new types of agent
defeat munitions are needed. These systems must be able to perform their
missions in scenarios in which NBC targets are protected by air defenses
and (in the future) missile defenses. Concurrently, there is a requirement
for a new system for the prediction of the collateral hazards that might
result from attacks on NBC targets. The collateral effects induced by damage
to the chemical or biological weapon targets may be far more significant
than the direct and collateral effects induced by the munitions used in
the attack.
The Counterproliferation Support Program is supporting
several specific projects in the counterforce area. The investments focus
on sensors, collateral effects mitigation, weapon effects and target response,
advanced weapons and warheads, munitions for neutralization of chemical
and biological agents, concepts for defeat of tunnels, and a Counterproliferation
ACTD.
Priorities for new sensors to support counterforce operations
include tactical Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) and airborne forward looking
infrared radar for target surveillance, characterization, battle damage
assessment and collateral effects monitoring, and developing a weapon-borne
sensor to enhance underground target bomb damage assessment; $9.3 million
has been budgeted in FY 1996 for these programs as part of the Sensor Technology
Project.
Improving our understanding of collateral effects release
phenomenology and transport is a priority for counterforce attacks against
NBC targets. Approximately $8.9 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for
source term characterization and transport prediction, phenomenology experiments,
and assessment tools.
Improving the state of knowledge in weapons effects and
target vulnerability/response is required to ensure that counterforce operations
are effective. Over $9 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for experimental
and analytical assessment of NBC target vulnerability response and automated
target planning for NBC targets/proliferation path assessments to assist
in target identification and strike planning.
Developing advanced penetrating weapons and advanced warheads/payloads
for enhanced lethality and functional kill against hard underground targets
is required because some proliferants have opted to locate their NBC capabilities
in underground or otherwise hard-to-defeat locations and facilities. In
FY 1996, $14.3 million has been budgeted to develop an enhanced penetrating
munition to defeat underground targets. It will be compatible with most
tactical delivery platforms and have all-weather, anti-jam precision guidance
capability. Additionally, $3.5 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for
development of a high temperature incendiary weapon payload and a classified
payload.
Concern regarding collateral effects has prompted efforts
to develop new types of biological and chemical agent neutralization weapons.
Approximately $4 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for development of
prototype agent defeat munitions.
We are also emphasizing tunnel defeat concepts, target
response, and vulnerability assessment because some proliferants have opted
to make use of these very difficult-to-defeat facilities. Approximately
$9.9 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 to assess tunnel response and
vulnerability.
ACTDs are a new approach to acquisition. They rapidly
integrate and demonstrate new military applications of current technologies.
They are performed for a warfighting command customer and provide (following
demonstration) a small quantity of new prototype systems. Responding to
a CINC priority, a Counterproliferation ACTD is being conducted to integrate
advanced sensors, mission planning tools, collateral effects prediction
capability, and enhanced conventional weapons. The ACTD is designed to
support rapid fielding of these new capabilities; $2.7 million has been
budgeted for this program in FY 1996.
These new DoD counterforce initiatives are supplemented
by current DARPA and DNA programs. The DARPA "Warbreaker" or
Critical Mobile Targets Project is focusing on Distributed Interactive
Simulation to support R&D activities associated with sensor systems,
communication sites, and information processing systems to detect, identify,
and prosecute high value, time-critical fixed and mobile targets such as
theater ballistic missiles, tanks, and artillery; $135 million has been
budgeted for this project in FY 1996. DNA's weapon system lethality program
is developing lethality criteria for a full spectrum of weapons, including
precision guided munitions and advanced conventional and unconventional
payloads. The target base includes hard and superhard underground facilities,
fixed surface facilities, and seabased structures; $46 million has been
budgeted for this project in FY 1996.
MEASURES TO COUNTER PARAMILITARY, COVERT, AND TERRORIST
THREATS
Acquisition investments in this category are intended
to protect military and civilian personnel, facilities, and logistical/mobilization
nodes from this special class of NBC threats, both in the United States
and overseas. This category of threat is increasing. Particularly challenging
is the threat of covertly emplaced NBC weapons. The chemical weapon attack
on the Tokyo subway by Japanese terrorists is a grim example. DoD is actively
pursuing several activities to counter paramilitary, covert delivery, and
terrorist NBC threats and protect military facilities and logistical/mobilization
nodes against these threats. These include supporting, training, and equipping
Joint Special Operations Forces, Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) teams,
and NBC weapon response teams to detect, neutralize, and render safe NBC
devices both in the United States and overseas. These DoD capabilities
can be provided to assist appropriate U.S. government authorities in countering
these threats, operating within the parameters provided by law and regulation;
the Defense Department is not a domestic police agency.
DoD is devoting significant resources to developing the
necessary technical means to counter NBC paramilitary, covert delivery,
and terrorist threats. Much effort is underway in tactical intelligence
and related programs to conduct counterproliferation missions. Other programs
include development of special warfare and C3 equipment, airbase protection
programs, Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) support activities, multi-Service
EOD teams, and RDT&E of advanced technologies to support the U.S. Special
Operations Command and EOD operations. Just over $12 million has been budgeted
for these programs in FY 1996.
New DoD initiatives to counter paramilitary/covert and
terrorist NBC threats are being supported by the Counterproliferation Support
Program. These efforts are focused on developing an effective response
to chemical and biological threats through development of BW/CW emergency
response teams modeled on Department of Energy's NEST. Projects underway
include evaluation of military facility NBC defense and developing enabling
technologies and equipment to support and fund joint training exercises
to improve readiness of NBC response teams. Just under $5 million has been
budgeted for these projects in FY 1996. The Department of Energy national
laboratories are also contributing to these projects, including work with
DNA's Nuclear Incident Program to improve military base and mobilization/logistical
node defense against nuclear threats.
Finally, the Navy's Joint Service Explosive Ordinance
Disposal Systems program develops specialized EOD equipment and tools required
for detecting, locating, and rendering safe NBC munitions. The Navy has
budgeted about $4.8 million for this program in FY 1996.
Intelligence
Effective intelligence support is critical to all aspects
of the DoD counterproliferation effort. To assist Department officials
in taking advantage of proliferation prevention and protection opportunities,
the Intelligence Community must provide accurate and timely intelligence
assessments on the motivations and plans of leaders in states that may
elect to develop NBC weapon capabilities, the clandestine procurement networks
used by these states, the status of their NBC weapon programs, and locations
of both weapon production capabilities and deployed weapons. Information
on NBC weapon-related intentions, capabilities, and activities of transnational
groups, such as ethnic or regional movements, terrorists groups, or organized
criminal elements, also is needed. This is a demanding set of requirements.
The dual-use nature of many technologies involved in NBC and delivery systems
development complicate these tasks.
The Intelligence Community has taken steps to improve
the management and coordination of intelligence support to DoD customers.
As part of this effort, additional DoD personnel -- including the addition
of a military deputy -- have been assigned to the DCI's Nonproliferation
Center (NPC) -- the Intelligence Community body that orchestrates intelligence
activities related to proliferation. NPC and the Intelligence Community
have instituted a new strategic planning, resource guidance, and evaluation
process that better serves overall counterproliferation efforts. The Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), however, remains the prime conduit for national-level
intelligence support to the Defense Department. To better focus its intelligence
support to counterproliferation, it created an Office for Counterproliferation
and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Assessments.
As the threat from proliferants has increased, the Intelligence
Community has provided timely information in support of diplomatic, law
enforcement, and military efforts to prevent proliferation. The successes
of these efforts range from providing actionable intelligence to decisionmakers
so they can attempt to stop specific activities to supporting the development
of U.S. strategies to deal with proliferators.
Moreover, intelligence programs provide the critical input
to the challenges for military planning and operations -- chemical and
biological agent detection, characterization of underground activities,
information on weapon design to facilitate disabling activities, locating
and identifying mobile targets, and calculating weapons effects. In addition,
increasingly accurate U.S. weapons require even more fine-grained intelligence
information on proliferants' facilities and weapons effects.
Particular emphasis has been given to providing increased
warning time before potential adversaries translate technological potential
for proliferation into operational NBC weapon capabilities. U.S. acquisition
-- and even training and doctrine -- lead times do not permit the luxury
of a "wait and see" approach. With lead times for new U.S. capabilities
sometimes as long as five to ten years, DoD needs to be able to anticipate
the threats that might be faced in future regional contingencies through
early analysis of a proliferant's NBC weapons efforts. To meet this requirement,
the Intelligence Community has established new working arrangements with
the technical expertise of the Department of Energy and its national labs.
This has expanded from a primarily nuclear focus to include chemical and
biological weapon threat detection, characterization, and analysis.
International Cooperation
It is very likely that we will not fight alone on the
battlefields of the future. Future conflicts are likely to involve coalition
operations, as was the case in the Gulf War. Building and maintaining coalitions
in such conflicts will be one of the keys to successful military operations.
The ability to protect our populations, territory, and forces, and those
of our friends and allies, therefore, becomes a paramount consideration
in building and maintaining coalitions, as well as succeeding in military
operations. As a result, the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative places
great emphasis on international cooperation in preparation for future crises
or conflicts where the threat or use of NBC weapons may be present.
DoD has been working with America's long-time allies in
Europe and Asia to develop a common approach to counterproliferation. Following
President Clinton's emphasis at the January 1994 NATO Summit on the danger
to Alliance members from NBC proliferation, significant progress has been
made in integrating counterproliferation policy into the new, post-Cold
War agenda of the Alliance.
At the summit, NATO Heads of State directed that the Alliance
intensify and expand its political and defense efforts against proliferation.
Three groups were subsequently created: the Joint Committee on Proliferation
(JCP), which monitors overall Alliance efforts; the Senior Politico-Military
Group on Proliferation (SGP), which focuses on how NATO can reinforce traditional
nonproliferation efforts; and the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation
(DGP), which examines the defense aspects of proliferation, including the
military capabilities needed to discourage NBC proliferation, deter NBC
weapons use, and if necessary, to protect NATO territory, populations,
and forces.
In May 1994, NATO approved two milestone documents: a
political framework paper structuring the broad political-military approach
of the Alliance to proliferation, and a three-phase workplan for the DGP
to address the defense implications of proliferation. The DGP is co-chaired
by the United States and one of the European Allies on a rotating basis.
France provided the first European co-chair. Having assessed the risks
posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons to the Alliance, the DGP has
begun the next phase of its work, in which it is grappling with the operational
implications of the threat or use of NBC weapons for Alliance military
capabilities. In this task, NATO is building on the relevant capabilities
of the national militaries and the ongoing work of NATO planning groups.
NATO is working to establish a framework for defense activities related
to proliferation and to reach conclusions on the full spectrum of Alliance
and national capabilities needed to deal with the range of proliferation
threats.
The DGP's work is an important part of the Alliance's
continuing adaptation to the new security environment. NATO shows that
the United States is not alone in its concern for the defense dimension
of proliferation. Today, the Alliance sees dealing with proliferation as
one of its key missions. This demonstrates that the Alliance remains committed
-- indeed, well-qualified -- to address emerging security concerns. It
also provides a tangible example of the continued interest of the European
allies in cooperative transatlantic security with the United States.
The Government of Japan has also recognized the growing
danger from attacks with missiles, including those armed with NBC warheads,
the need to strengthen the defensive capabilities of U.S. and Japanese
forces, and the necessity of maintaining capabilities for combined joint
operations. To meet this threat, the United States and Japan are working
to identify the theater missile defense capability Japan will need and
to evaluate options for acquiring that capability in future years, including
opportunities for cooperative programs.
DoD is currently beginning other cooperative efforts with
allies. A defense science symposium involving participants from the United
States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia was conducted in the United
States in March 1995. This symposium focused on counterproliferation technology
applications and on the identification of opportunities for collaborative
research and development to enhance counterproliferation capabilities.
The United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom have initiated a cooperative
R&D program to improve capabilities for detecting, characterizing,
and providing protection against biological and chemical agents based on
lessons learned during the Gulf War.
PREVENTION
Overview
Proliferation prevention is the United States' primary
objective. DoD contributions to proliferation prevention are part of a
coordinated national effort involving multiple departments and agencies,
allied states, and international organizations. Defense Department support
includes the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, export
control activities and DoD inspection, verification, and enforcement support
for the treaties and arms control regimes that limit NBC weapons and associated
delivery systems. The Defense Department also plays an important role in
the four thrusts involved in proliferation prevention -- denial, reassurance,
dissuasion, and actions to reverse proliferation.
International norms and standards make an important contribution
to proliferation prevention. In addition to creating an atmosphere of restraint,
they may provide the preconditions, e.g., inspections, that impede proliferation.
These international norms can be specifically agreed to in export control
and arms control agreements or they can result from informal arrangements
between states.
A great success in the area of norm establishment has
been DoD support for the unconditional and indefinite extension of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT, which became effective in 1970,
establishes obligations for both nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons
states regarding the transfer, manufacture, or acquisition of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices. It allows all parties to participate
in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific
and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while
at the same time prohibiting transfer and acquisition of nuclear weapon
capabilities.
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
The CTR program provides the services, tools, and technology
required to help the New Independent States (NIS) with the elimination
or reduction of weapons of mass destruction and to modernize and expand
safeguards against proliferation within the NIS. The program consists currently
of nearly 40 separate projects, grouped into three categories, reflecting
the objectives established by Congress.
First, Destruction and Dismantlement activities help with
the dismantlement and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their
launchers in the four eligible states where they remain (Russia, Belarus,
Kazakstan, and Ukraine). The availability of U.S. assistance encourages
these countries to undertake the dismantling of weapons, and then the CTR
program provides the actual equipment, services, and training required
to implement their dismantlement decisions. Specifically, CTR Dismantlement
and Destruction activities are:
- Assisting Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan in becoming
non-nuclear weapons states.
- Assisting Russia in accelerating strategic arms reduction
to START levels.
- Initiating and accelerating the destruction of Russian
chemical weapons.
Projects in this area assist in the dismantlement or destruction
of strategic nuclear missiles, silo launchers, liquid and solid rocket
propellants, and Russian chemical weapons. Also included is assistance
in the destruction of the launcher tubes in ballistic missile-firing submarines,
the elimination of heavy bombers, and the elimination or conversion of
the infrastructure (hardware and personnel) that supports these systems.
Second, through chain of custody activities, the CTR program
decreases the dangers from the nuclear weapons and fissile materials that
remain in the NIS, particularly Russia. During the difficult and uncertain
period of transition in these states, the continued secure chain of custody
of nuclear weapons and materials is vitally important to both the United
States and the NIS. Chain of Custody activities enhance security, safety,
and control of nuclear weapons and fissile material in Russia by assisting
in centralizing fissile material in a limited number of storage areas and
strengthening safety, security, and control during movement and interim
storage. Projects provide assistance to enhance effective controls over
nuclear weapons and the fissile materials removed from them throughout
the drawdown and dismantlement of these weapons. This includes providing
safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapons from operational sites
and storage areas to dismantlement facilities; improved security and accountability
for weapons in transit; safer and more secure storage and transport of
fissile material removed from nuclear weapons by providing storage containers;
and designing, equipping, and assisting in construction of centralized
fissile material storage facilities.
Finally, CTR supports Demilitarization efforts. CTR Demilitarization
activities are encouraging the demilitarization of Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakstan,
and Russia by supporting conversion of NIS defense enterprises, expanding
defense military contacts, and reemploying weapons scientists. These activities
are decreasing the long-term threat by reducing the capacity and economic
pressures in the NIS to continue to produce weapons of mass destruction.
CTR supported defense conversion industrial partnerships
help to reduce the potential of a future nuclear threat at its source,
as do international science and technology centers the United States and
other countries have set up in Moscow and Kiev. Through these centers,
former Soviet nuclear scientists and engineers are being reemployed in
peaceful, civilian endeavors. These projects reduce the supply of weapons
of mass destruction available for foreign sale, the incentives for relying
on such sales for income, and provide job alternatives for weapons scientists
who might otherwise be tempted to sell their nuclear expertise abroad.
The defense conversion investments under CTR are win-win-win -- they help
reduce the threats from weapons of mass destruction; they help the NIS
build peaceful, commercially viable market economies while reducing excess
military capacity; and they provide opportunities for U.S. industry's entry
into potentially large markets for civilian goods and services.
CTR ACCOMPLISHMENTS
CTR has gone far to reduce the threat of proliferation
within and outside the former Soviet Union in the three short years of
its existence, and the bulk of the achievements have been in just the past
year. The program has facilitated the return to Russia of over 1,700 warheads
from Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine; the removal to secure storage of
over 2,800 warheads from missile and bomber bases; the deactivation of
four regiments of SS-19 ICBMs in Ukraine; the removal of 750 missiles from
their launchers; and the elimination of approximately 630 strategic launchers
and 91 bombers throughout the NIS. CTR assistance also helped prompt Ukraine
to begin early deactivation and shipment to Russia of SS-19 and SS-24 warheads
and to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear
weapons state, thereby allowing the Start I treaty to enter into force
-- a key nonproliferation success.
CTR has contributed to other efforts to prevent proliferation.
Over 5,000 former Soviet weapon scientists and engineers once engaged in
nuclear weapons research are now or soon will be employed on peaceful,
civilian research projects, thus reducing the threat of the transfer of
their deadly expertise to potential proliferant states. The Project Sapphire
mission in November 1994 to remove 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium
to the United States from Kazakstan was partially financed with CTR funds.
Denial
Denial involves carefully targeted export controls and
the disruption of weapons and technology trade which would assist the potential
proliferant in obtaining NBC weapons and delivery systems. U.S. export
control policy has two principal objectives. First, we want to stop --
or at least retard -- the transfer to potential proliferant states of those
technologies which could permit them to design, manufacture, or acquire
NBC weapons and their delivery systems and other dangerous armaments. Second,
we want to monitor flows of dual-use technologies that are acceptable in
themselves, but which if diverted or applied to military end uses could
have a negative impact on our national security interests. Some of the
key objectives are as presented below:
DoD's technology security program is designed to prevent
the transfer of dangerous and sensitive technologies to countries that
pose security threats. When technology is transferred to a country that
does not pose a threat, DoD contributes to national efforts to ensure that
the transfer is done in a manner that does not endanger U.S. interests
or compromise our national security. In addition to controlling transfers
of destabilizing conventional weapons and associated dual-use technologies,
DoD's technology security program supports the Department's Counterproliferation
Initiative.
The Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA)
provides unique military expertise in the processes used to review export
applications and serves as the primary DoD agent for executing DoD's portion
of the U.S. denial strategy. In order to prioritize export control reviews
as they apply to chokepoints, DTSA applies the OSD Critical Technology
Support Program, a congressionally mandated mechanism for identifying the
most important, militarily relevant technologies. Assistance is provided
by the Department of Energy's Office of Energy Intelligence, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and other DoD components.
Defense Department and other U.S. Intelligence Community organizations
actively support the export review process by identifying the key technologies
that enable NBC proliferation. Intelligence provides important information
on pending or ongoing foreign shipments of critical materials, to include
technical assessments of materials and whether they are intended for legitimate
civilian use or for military applications.
These analysts also provide critical information on how
proliferants acquire technologies and materials through the use of complicated
covert procurement networks. Because many of these networks include maritime
transport, the Counterproliferation Support Program is directly supporting
the deployment this year of the Navy's Specific Emitter Identification
(SEI) System to improve DoD's capabilities to identify and track ships
at sea suspected of transporting NBC weapons, delivery systems, and NBC
related materials. DoD has budgeted approximately $2.8 million to continue
the development of special SEI equipment in FY 1996.
These intelligence capabilities will help the United States
maintain and strengthen controls on critical technologies. These controls
can have a dramatic effect on slowing the pace of programs and raising
their costs. This contribution is important to the ongoing efforts to focus
and strengthen key international export control regimes. These capabilities
can also be used to support diplomatic demarches and international inspections.
Accurate and timely information on a proliferant's activities and intentions
can be used to build a global consensus that international norms have been
violated.
While DoD shares responsibility for U.S. policy on international
regimes with the State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
and others, the Defense Department provides unique technical and military
expertise vital to making these regimes effective. In addition to intelligence
support, DoD participates in the negotiation of these regimes, providing
valuable operational and technical knowledge.
DoD also plays a leadership role in the implementation
of many arms control and nonproliferation regimes. For example, DNA has
focused efforts on technologies to assist in verification of arms control
agreements; the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) is responsible for implementing
inspection and escort and monitoring requirements under the verification
provisions of several U.S. treaties and agreements. A total of $84.6 million
has been budgeted for OSIA inspection support in FY 1996. The primary export
control and international nonproliferation regimes are outlined below,
with specific DoD contributions highlighted.
COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROLS
(COCOM) SUCCESSOR REGIME
COCOM was a Cold War era export control regime in which
the United States and allies restricted the export of technologies to the
Soviet Union and other communist countries. DoD has played a central role
in negotiations designed to replace COCOM with a new export control regime.
The aim is to provide transparency, responsibility, and restraint in the
transfer of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use technologies to countries
and regions of concern, to include areas where U.S. and allied forces might
face hostile military actions. This regime is designed to complement and
reinforce other export control regimes. Through cooperation and sharing
of information, it will enable the United States and other participating
countries to better track and monitor sensitive arms and technology transfers
as they occur. Russia and other formerly COCOM proscribed countries have
been given incentives, such as greater access to advanced technologies,
to join the regime -- provided they agree to follow the regimeÕs
rules. This parallels other DoD efforts, such as CTR, to address the potential
spread of NBC weapons and their delivery systems, advanced conventional
weapons, and sensitive dual-use technologies from Russia and other states
of the former Soviet Union.
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)
The MTCR is a voluntary arrangement of 28 states including
the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Russia, Japan, Australia, New
Zealand, Argentina, and Hungary. It controls exports of equipment and technology
-- both military and dual-use -- that are relevant to missile development,
production, and operation. DoD provides intelligence and operational expertise
for the national-level decisions that are made, on a case-by-case basis,
concerning implementation of this regime's controls
NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS' GROUP (NSG)
This group, comprising 30 countries, seeks to control
exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, both nuclear-specific
and dual-use. Russia is a member of this group. Other former Soviet Republics
-- notably Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakstan -- are not. China and Brazil
are among the major potential suppliers of nuclear resources that are not
members. The United States' position is that observance of NSG guidelines
for nuclear exports by all potential suppliers (irrespective of their decision
to join the group) is crucial for controlling the flow of nuclear materials
and technologies.
AUSTRALIA GROUP
The Australia Group is an informal arrangement of 29 industrial
countries including the United States, Canada, most of Western Europe,
Japan, New Zealand, and Australia. It seeks to prevent the spread of chemical
and biological weapons material and dual-use technology. The group holds
information exchanges and prepares lists of chemical precursors, microorganisms,
and related equipment for member countries to control by export licensing
and monitoring.
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)
The United States is seeking to conclude negotiations
in the Conference on Disarmament on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in
1996. A CTBT will strengthen the global norm against proliferation of nuclear
weapons and constrain development of nuclear weapons capability in both
proliferant states and acknowledged nuclear weapon states. DoD provides
technical expertise in the CTBT negotiations. The Defense Department's
Advanced Research Projects Agency has a program to demonstrate the capabilities
of seismic and nonseismic monitoring systems for use in verification of
a CTBT (approximately $14 million has been budgeted for FY 1996). The Air
Force also has a program, the Nuclear Detonation Detection System, which
is aimed at improving capabilities to detect nuclear detonations. Approximately
$16 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for this program.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)
The BWC, signed in 1972, prohibits development, production,
and stockpiling of biological weapons. The United States is promoting new
measures that provide increased transparency of potential biological weapons-related
activities and facilities in an effort to help deter violations of and
enhance compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention. DoD will participate
in the U.S. delegation to the forthcoming BWC Ad Hoc Group negotiations
and will play an important role in U.S. efforts to develop off-site and
on-site compliance verification measures for consideration by the group.
The United States strongly supports the development of a legally binding
protocol of such measures to strengthen the BWC.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)
The CWC bans the use, development, production, acquisition,
stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons. Opened for signature on
January 13, 1993, as of March 15, 1996, the CWC had 160 signatories and
will enter into force 180 days following deposit of the 65th ratification
with the United Nations (currently there are 49 ratifications). The CWC
Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) is meeting to complete the details necessary
to have the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
fully operational at entry into force.
DoD has participated actively throughout the PrepCom process,
providing expertise on a range of implementation issues such as inspection
procedures, data management, and inspector training. Specifically, DNA
is accomplishing the CWC Verification Technology Program, which focuses
on the technologies required for multinational verification of the CWC.
Approximately $12.6 million has been budgeted for this program in FY 1996.
The nonproliferation regimes discussed above may not be
able to prevent proliferation by a determined leadership. Experience suggests
that a determined proliferant is likely to succeed. The effectiveness of
denial strategy should be determined by the extent to which it frustrates
and slows proliferants' efforts, and in the message denial efforts convey
regarding our seriousness of purpose. This success is best measured as
a function of time -- time to improve regional instabilities that affect
the motivations to acquire or develop NBC weapons and their delivery systems,
and time to dissuade existing and potential proliferants.
Reassurance and Dissuasion
Denial efforts put time on our side, but time is not enough.
Denial must be complemented by regional security dialogue, arms control
and confidence building, security assistance, and other forms of reassurance
that security needs can be met without resorting to NBC proliferation,
and with a vigorous public diplomacy campaign which emphasizes the political,
economic, and military costs of proliferation.
Regional instability remains one motivation for proliferation.
By reducing regional tensions, we can help reduce the demand for both NBC
and advanced conventional weapons. The Organization on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) and the Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security
(ACRS) working group are two regional arms control and confidence building
fora that work to broker agreements to reduce regional tensions. The OSCE
has provided the framework for the negotiation of several important European
security agreements such as the 1990, 1992, and 1994 Vienna Documents and
the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The OSCE Forum for
Security Cooperation agreed to a Code of Conduct for political-military
behavior, a Global Exchange of Military Information, and Nonproliferation
Principles at the 1994 OSCE Budapest Summit. Created in 1991 as part of
the Madrid Middle East peace process, ACRS is a forum for developing regional
confidence building measures. ACRS is one of several multilateral working
groups in the Madrid process designed to complement the bilateral peace
talks. DoD has played a critical role in supporting these efforts by providing
operational and technical expertise to these negotiations.
U.S. Security Assistance programs also can help to defuse
regional tensions by enabling friends and allies to acquire conventional
equipment, services and training for legitimate self-defense and to support
participation in multilateral security efforts, such as coalition warfare.
U.S. Security Assistance programs include Foreign Military Sales, International
Military Education and Training, and emergency provision of excess U.S.
defense articles. These programs supplement U.S. overseas presence and
peacetime engagement by improving the defense capabilities of allies and
friends, while demonstrating U.S. commitment to defend common interests.
Alliances and bilateral defense arrangements create a
powerful incentive for allies and friends to refrain from the acquisition
of NBC weapons. Through the forward deployment of U.S. military forces,
the United States provides allies with tangible demonstrations of our commitment
to their security, not withstanding proliferation by other nations in their
region. The forward deployment of capable combat forces and periodic demonstrations
of our ability to deploy additional forces from the United States, when
and as required, may be the Department of Defense's most important contribution
to proliferation prevention. These tangible demonstrations of security
commitments make it possible for responsible leaderships in allied and
friendly nations to conclude that they can rely on U.S. security commitments
to provide for their security.
Military-to-military cooperation and contacts also help
reassure friends and allies while at the same time dissuading the acquisition
of NBC weapons and technology. The extensive U.S. bilateral military-to-military
contact program builds trust and promotes professionalism in the armed
forces of our friends and allies. These contacts also reinforce basic tenets
such as civilian control of the military and the honoring of international
norms of behavior.
Regional arms control and confidence building, security
assistance and alliance efforts, and military-to-military contacts, however,
are only as good as our ability to effectively communicate our intent to
proliferants and those threatened by that proliferation. U.S. counterproliferation
efforts are part of this public diplomacy campaign. The preparations we
undertake through the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative will provide
the ability to protect our forces, allies, and future Coalition partners
from the consequences of NBC weapons and their delivery systems attack.
This initiative is designed to support our public diplomacy campaign by
not only convincing proliferants they gain no advantage through NBC weapons
and their delivery systems proliferation (at great expense), but also by
helping states resist the temptation to proliferate in response to an adversary's
proliferation.
Actions to Reverse Proliferation
Measures to reverse proliferation are the final component
of prevention. In some instances, this is involuntary, as in Iraq under
UN supervision. In other cases action is self-initiated, as appears to
have been the case in South Africa and the non-Russian nuclear weapons
states formerly part of the Soviet Union. Available policy instruments
here include making available intelligence information concerning the status
of regional proliferation (and proliferation reversal) efforts, initiatives
to defuse regional tensions that might motivate proliferation, and support
for inspection and verification activities. CTR in the nuclear-weapon-possessing
New Independent States formerly part of the Soviet Union is particularly
significant.
CONCLUSION
